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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaint 1ff-Appellant, 
vs. ) 
) 
MARTIN RAY AMADOR, ) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent. ) 
Case No. 900007-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The jurisdiction of the Utah Court Appeals is established by 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(f) (1989). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Findinqs of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order Terminatina Probation Nunc Pro Tunc issued by the 
Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County, State of 
Utah. The effect of the Order was the dismissal of an order to 
show cause previously executed by the court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in its interpretation of State 
v. Green? 
2. Did the trial court err in refusina to retroactively 
apply Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(8)(b) (1989)? 
3. Did the trial court err in its interpretation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)( a) (1984)? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1f8)(b) (1989): 
The runninq of the probation period is 
tolled upon the filina of a violation report 
with the court alleqinq a violation of the 
terms and conditions of probation or upon the 
issuance of an order to show cause or warrant 
by the court. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(10) (a) f1984) : 
Upon completion without violation of 18 
months probation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B 
misdemeanor cases, the offender shall be 
terminated from sentence and the supervision 
of the Division of Corrections, unless the 
person is earlier terminated by the court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Martin Ray Amador was placed on supervised 
probation on March 1, 1988, for a period of eiqhteen (18) months, 
after beinq convicted of Kidnappinq, a Second-Deqree Felony, and 
Aqqravated Assault, a Third-Deqree Felony. (R-50) On Auqust 16, 
1989, an information charamq Defendant with contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor was filed in Fifth Circuit Court. On 
Auqust 21, 1989, Aqent J. Lowe Barton of the Utah State 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) prepared a 
proqress/violation report based on the alleqed offense. (R-74) 
A copy of the proaress/violation report was sent to the Iron 
County Attorney's Office and to Judqe J. Philip Eves, Fifth 
District Court. The copy to the Iron County Attorney's Office is 
date-stamped as received September 1, 1989. The copy in the 
Fifth District Court file is not date-stamped, (R-74) On 
Auqust 23, 1.989, Aqent Barton prepared and swore to an affidavit 
in support of an order to show cause. (R-81) The affidavit was 
presented to Judoe Eves on September 5, 1989, and he sianed an 
order to show cause that same day. (R-80) The affidavit and 
order to snow cause were served on Defendant September 11. 1989. 
(R-83) Defendant filed a motion to terminate probation nunc pro 
tunc,, claimma his pronation statutorily terminated prior to the 
issuance of the order to show cause. (R-75) The State of Utah 
filed a memorandum in opposition to Defendant's motion, (R-86) 
A hearina was held on October 17, 1989. The trial court oranted 
Defendant's motion, findmq probation had terminated prior to the 
execution of the order to show cause. (R-114, see also Addendum 
Exhibit 1) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court: erred in its interpretation of State v. 
Green. The trial court also erred in refusino to apply Utah Code 
Ann. §77-18-1(8)(b) (1989). Alternatively, the trial court erred 
in its interpretation of what constitutes "completion without 
violation" under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10) (a) (1984). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STATE V. GREEN DOES NOT HOLD THAT THE 
APPLICABLE LAW IN REVOKING PROBATION IS THE 
LAW AT THE TIME PROBATION BEGAN. 
In the instant case, the trial court based its dismissal of 
the order to show cause on State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 
1988). The Green opinion specifically reserved the issue of the 
retention of jurisdiction when revocation proceedinqs are 
initiated but not completed within the statutory probation 
period. l_d. at 465, n, 3. Despite this reservation, the trial 
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court applied Green to the instant case since "the Supreme Court 
held in the Green case tnat the lav; apolyinq to termination of 
probation nad to be the law that was in effect at the time the 
defendant was put on probation, not the law that was in effect at 
the time he was terminated from probation . . . . " (R-116, 
Addendum Exhibit 1 paqe 3) This is simply not the holdinq in 
Green. True, in Green
 y Justice Durham under both headnote 4 and 
footnote 4 refers back to the law in effect in 1984 at the time 
of Green's probation, specifically Utah Code Ann, §77-18-
1(10) (a). But the Court did not draw a distinction between the 
law at the time probation oeqan in 1984 and the law at the time 
probation terminated in 1985, as the trial court suqqests. (In 
fact, but for the phrase "and the supervision of tne Division of 
Corrections," subsection 10(a) was identical in 1984 and 1985.) 
Rather, the Green Court drew a distinction between the law at the 
time of probation and the lav; subsequent to the termination of 
probation. In Green the State initiated revocation proceedinqs 
several months after Green's probation period terminated 
statutorily. The Green Court did not hold the applicable law to 
revoke probation is the law in effect at the commencement of 
probation; rather, the Court held tne applicable law to revoke 
pronation is the law in effect at the time of probation. Of 
course, the Green court went on to hold that tne State may not 
commence revocation proceedinas after probation has statutorily 
terminated. 
POINT II 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18 -1 (8Wb) (1989) IS A 
PROCEDURAL AMENDMENT OR STATUTE AND THEREFORE 
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SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPLIED IN THE INSTANT CASE, 
THEREBY TOLLING THE RUNNING OF THE PROBATION 
PERIOD. 
Effective April 24, 1989, Utah Code Ann. § 7 7-18-1 (8) (b) 
states, "The runnma of the probation period is tolled upon the 
filmq ot a violation report with tne court alleqinq a violation 
of the terms and conditions ot probation or upon the issuance of 
an order to snow cause or a warrant by the court.n Such was the 
law in effect at the time of Defendant's probation. Subsection 
8(b), when enacted, was applicable to pendinq actions, such as 
the instant case. In State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577 (Utah 1983), 
tne Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed its lonq-standlnq exception to 
the non-retroactivity rule in Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3 (1986). The 
Norton Court held, "Remedial and procedural amendments apply to 
accrued, pendinq, and future actions." Icl. at 585. Defendant's 
probation period was clearly oendinq in April of 1989. 
Subsection 8(b) is also clearly a procedural amendment. 
Several cases, includinq Norton, have attempted to clarify 
the distinction between a retroactive procedural amendment or 
statute and a non-retroactive substantive amendment or statute. 
In
 Nor ton , the Court affirmed Norton's conviction for first-
dearee murder but set aside his death sentence and remanded the 
matter for resentencina. At the time Norton committed the crime 
in 1979, Utah Code Ann. §76-3-207(3) mandated that when a death 
sentence is set aside and remanded, life imprisonment must be 
imposed. While Norton's appeal was pendinq, section 76-3-207(3) 
was repealed and the new provision allowed for a death sentence 
on remand. Norton araued the applicaole law was the law at the 
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t i m e t h e c r i m e was c o m m i t t e d . H o w e v e r , a s t h e C o u r t e x p l a i n e d , 
"The r e s e n t e n c i n q p r o v i s i o n i s a p r o c e d u r a l s t a t u t e . I t h a s 
n o t n i n q t o do w i t h t h e s u b s t a n c e of d e f e n d a n t ' s c r i m e o r e v e n 
w i t h t h e a m o u n t of p u n i s h m e n t s p e c i f i e d f o r i t . Tne a m e n d m e n t 
may o r may n o t a f f e c t t h e o u t c o m e when d e f e n d a n t i s r e -
s e n t e n c e d . . . . " Ijd. T h e s a m e r e a s o n i n a a p p l i e s t o 
s u b s e c t i o n 3 ( b ) and D e f e n d a n t Amador . The amendment n a s n o t h i n o 
t o do w i t h d e f e n d a n t ' s c r i m e s t h e m s e l v e s o r w i t h t h e p r e s c r i b e d 
p u n i s h m e n t . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e amendment q u a r a n t e e s no s p e c i f i c 
o u t c o m e a f t e r t n e o r d e r t o show c a u s e h e a r i n g . 
I n C a r l u c c i v . Utah S t a t e I n d u s t r i a l C o m m i s s i o n , 7 25 P . 2d 
1 3 3 5 , 1337 (Utan 1986) , , t h e C o u r t e x p l a i n e d p r o c e d u r a l s t a t u t e s 
" d o n o t c r e a t e , a l t e r , o r d e s t r o y s u b s t a n t i v e r i a h t s . " 
S u b s e c t i o n 8 ( b ) d i d n o t c r e a t e , a l t e r , o r d e s t r o y a n y s u b s t a n t i v e 
n q n t s of d e f e n d a n t . D e f e n d a n t may a r q u e he had a s u b s t a n t i v e 
r i a h t t o t i m e l y t e r m i n a t i o n o f h i s p r o b a t i o n a b s e n t a n y 
v i o l a t i o n . D e f e n d a n t may h a v e had an e x p e c t a t i o n , s e e N o r t o n , 
67 5 P . 2 d a t 5 8 6 , t h a t h i s p r o b a t i o n w o u l d a u t o m a t i c a l l y 
t e r m i n a t e , b u t h e c e r t a i n l y n a d no s u b s t a n t i v e r i a h t t o s u c h 
t e r m i n a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y m l i q h t of t h e a l l e q e d v i o l a t i o n . 
In P i l c h e r v . S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t of S o c i a l S e r v i c e s , 66 3 P . 2d 
4 5 0 , 455 (U tah 1 9 8 3 ) , t h e C o u r t e x p l a i n e d a r e t r o a c t i v e s t a t u t e 
" c h a n g e s o n l y p r o c e d u r a l law by p r o v i d m a a d i f f e r e n t mode o r 
form of p r o c e d u r e f o r e n f o r o i n a s u b s t a n t i v e n q n t s . " S i m i l a r l y , 
i n F o i l v . B a l l i n q e r , 601 P . 2 d 1 4 4 , 151 (Utah 1 9 7 9 ) , t h e C o u r t 
e x p l a i n e d r e t r o a c t i v e p r o c e d u r a l s t a t u t e s " s i m p l y q o v e r n 
t e c h n i c a l p r o v i s i o n s f o r t h e b r i n a i n q o f [ a n a c t i o n ] . " 
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Subsection 8(b) simply sets forth the procedure for enforcino the 
suostantive riqht of an order to show cause hearmq. 
Finally, in State Department of Social Services v. Higgs, 
656 P.2d 998, 1001 (Utah 1982), the Court explained "when the 
purpose of an amendment is to clarify tne meaninq of an earlier 
enactment, the amendment may be applied retroactively in pendinq 
actions." In Okland Construction Company v. Industrial 
Commiss ion , 520 P.2d 208, 210-211 (Utah 1974), the Court held 
non-retroactivity "has no application where the later statute or 
amendment deals only with clarification or amplification as to 
how tne law snould have been understood prior to its enactment." 
In Green , decided in June 1988, the Court criticized the State's 
position that a defendant's probation term is "tolled" when any 
violation occurs within the period and that there is no time 
limit for initiatina a revocation action. The writer of this 
brief was unable to refer to the leaislative tapes to determine 
whether or not subsection 8(b) was enacted in direct response to 
the Green opinion. Nevertneless, it appears to be much more than 
coincidence that ten montns after the Utah Supreme Court refers 
to the tollinq of a probation period, subsection 8(b) is enacted 
which allows for tollinq under certain conditions. Clearly, 
subsection 8(b) serves to clarify and amplify the oriqinal 
intended meaninq of the entire statute. 
The trial court should have applied subsection 8(b) in the 
instant case, thereby tollinq the probation period and allowmq 
the order to show cause hearina to proceed. 
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POINT III 
ALTERNATIVELY, UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18-
1(10) (a) (1984), A VIOLATION OF PROBATION 
DOES NOT REQUIRE THE EXECUTION AND ISSUANCE 
OP AN O R C L R TO SHOW CAUSE; THE FILING OF A 
PROGRESS/VIOLATION REPORT IS SUFFICIENT. 
Even if this Court finds tne trial court was correct in its 
interpretation or G r ee n and tnat subsection 8(b) is not 
applicable, tne Coart should still reverse the trial court's 
decision. Tne trial court concluded that under the 1984 version 
of section 77-18-1(10) (a) , IT order to violate probation, an 
order to snow cause must be ootained prior to tne termination 
date. The trial :oart offers no oasis for such an interpretation 
ot the law. Section 77-18-1(10) (a) in 1984 provided for 
automatic termination upon completion without violation. 
Defendant Amaoor did not complete his probation without 
v i o l a t i o n . Therefore his orooation did not terminate 
automatically on September 1, 1939, prior to the issuance of tne 
order to snow cause. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, tne State of Utah respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse tne Order Terminating Probation Nunc Pro Tunc 
and remand tne matter to tne trial court for further proceedings 
to determine wnetner section 77-18-1 18) (b) , as applied to the 
instant case, tolled tne runnina of the probation period, tnereby 
allowing tne order to show cause nearina to proceed. 
-8-
DATED t nis y day o f March, 1990. 
SCOTT M. BURNS 
Iron County Attorney 
By: 
KYLiTp. LATIMER 
ChiWx Deputy Iron County Attorney 
for Appellant State of Utan 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY tnat 1 mailed four (4) rrue and correct 
copies of tne foreqoinq BRIEF OF APPELLANT STATE OF UTAH to 
Mr. James L. Shumate, Esq., Attorney for Respondent, P.O. Box 
623, Cedar City, Utan 84721-0623, by first-class mail, postaae 
fully prepaid, on this g day of March, 1990. 
KYLE^T LATIMER ^ 
Chie^/Deputy Iron County Attorney 
for Appellant State of Utah 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 1 
KYLE D. LATIMER - USB #4867 
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . ] 
MARTIN RAY AMADOR, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
I FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAWf 
> AND ORDER TERMINATING 
PROBATION NUNC PRO TUNC 
I C r i m i n a l N o . 1 1 6 8 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on Tuesday, 
October 17, 1989, at 1:30 p.m. The Defendant, MARTIN RAY AMADOR, 
was present with his counsel of record, James L. Shumate. The 
State of Utah was represented by Scott M. Burns, Iron County 
Attorney, and Kyle D. Latimer, Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney. 
This matter came on before the Court for a hearinq on Defendant's 
Motion to Terminate Probation Nunc Pro Tunc and the consideration 
of an Order to Show Cause previously issued by the Court. After 
havinq reviewed the arquments of counsel and havina carefully 
reviewed the file in this matter, the Court now makes and enters 
the followinq Findinqs of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
Terminatinq Probation Nunc Pro Tunc, as taken verbatim from the 
court reporter's transcriot. 
We've nad a rather lenqthy recess, durinq which time 
I've had an opportunity to reread the Green decision in some 
detail- Also I've looked at Pilcher versus State Department 
of Social Services, 663 Pacific Second 450, particularly 
Headnotes 11 and 12, with reqard to the issue of retroactive 
applicatipn of the amended statute in this case. Trie 
statute which was amended as of April of 1989. 
Let me just reiterate for the record my -- the basis 
for my decision, first of all. In readinq the Green case, 
it is apparent that our particular case is not qoverned by 
the Green decision. Under Footnote 3, the Court indicated 
that because the revocation proceedings in the Green case 
were not initiated until after the statutory probation 
period had expired, that they need not reach the issue of 
the retention of jurisdiction when proceedinqs had been 
initiated but not completed within the 18-month term. 
Of course that raises the issue of what it means to 
initiate proceedinqs. And there is some difference of 
opinion as to what that means, but I'll tell you what my 
feelinq is. And that is that proceedinqs to violate 
probation are initiated when the probation department 
prepares and files with the Court a proqress and violation 
report or an Affidavit alleqino the violation of probation 
and a request for an Order to Show Cause. And that 
initiates the proceedinqs, whether or not the Court has 
sianed the Order to Show Cause, or whether there's any court 
order mvolved at all. That is the procedure which we will 
-2-
follow witn reqard to probation qoverned by the 1989 
enactment of 77-18-1, Et. seq. 
That does not solve the problem in this case because 
the question in this case is whether or not Mr. Amador's 
probation and the termination proceedmqs there are qoverned 
by the 1988 version of the law or the 1989 version of the 
law. 
In an effort to obtain some quidance as to which of 
those laws should apply, I reread the Green case aqain. And 
in that case, Justice Durham says under Headnote 4, "At the 
time this matter arose, Section 7 7-18-1 (10) (a) stated"--
and she refers to the 1984 enactment of the law. Even 
thouqh the order revokinq the defendant's probation and 
committinq him to prison was actually entered, as I 
remember, in 1987. Yes. In March of 1987. 
So tne Court -- the Supreme Court held in the Green 
case that the law applyinq to termination of probation had 
to be the law that was in effect at the time the defendant 
was put on probation, not tne law that was in effect at the 
time he was terminated from probation, it seems to me. 
Althouqh it wasn't addressed directly. 
In support of that is Footnote 4, which -- in which the 
Court said: "Under the statute in effect at the time of the 
defendants's pronation period, the trial court was not 
specifically empowered to do so." And it refers back to a 
discussion, in the body of the opinion, of the fact that 
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under then -- the existina law at the time this opinion was 
authored, the trial court had certain riqnts to extend 
probation, based upon violations, for an additional 18 
months. And tne Supreme Court noted that that was so now, 
but was not so with reaard to Mr. Green, Because at the time 
he was put on probation, tnose provisions were not in the 
statute. So that's another indication that the Supreme 
Court was lookma at the 1984 enactment rather than the 1987 
enactment or anythinq after 1984. 
So beinq faced with a matter that's never been 
apparently decided directly by any of our appellate courts, 
I have to try to quess what the appellate courts think the 
law is. And it appears to me, from the way the Green 
opinion was authored, that the law of tnis state is that the 
law at the time tne defendant is put on probation is the 
qoverninq statute. 
So we turn to the 1988 version of the law, which was 
the version that was in effect when Mr. Amador was put on 
probation. It does not provide for the tollina of any 
statute upon the initiation of probation violation 
proceedinqs. Instead, it says that probation terminates 
after a period of 18 months without violation, unless 
earlier terminated by tne Court. 
Aqain I'm left to try no auess what the leaislature 
meant by that. But it seems to me that based upon the 
lanquaae of Green and the actions of the Court of Appeals in 
-4-
Denny -- which have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals--
that what the leqislature was sayinq was that in order to 
terminate probation or to violate probation, you have to 
have obtained an Order to Show Cause prior to the 
termination date. And I would add to that or arrest the 
defendant and be holdinq him on a 72-hour hold for a 
violation which occurred durinq the probation period. 
And I'll just make this statement that in this court, 
if the defendant is found in violation of his probation by 
probation officers and actually arrested for that violation 
which occurred — apparently occurred in their presence and 
held for 72 hours, and durinq that 72 hours, they obtained 
from the Court an Order to Show Cause — even if durinq that 
72 hours the 18 months run, I'm qoing to find that they've 
done all they could to brinq the violation to the Court's 
attention within the statutory period under the old law. 
Applyinq all this to the case before us, I find that 
Mr. Amador's probation terminated as of September 1, 1989, 
and that under the provisions of the statute which applied 
in his case, the Order to Show Cause had not been siqned by 
the Court, nor had such an Order to Show Cause been obtained 
while he was being held on a 72-hour hold, and therefore, 
any alleqations of conduct after September 1 and/or any 
Order to Show Cause issued by the Court after September 1 
were not proper and timely, and they are vacated. 
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P r o b a t i o n i s t e r m i n a t e d n u n c p r o t u n c a s o f 
S e p t e m b e r 1 , 1 9 8 9 . 
DATED t h i s lo — d a y o f D e c e m b e r , 1 9 8 9 . 
j / . PHI LIP/EVES 
District Court Judqe 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the toreqoinq FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER 
TERMINATING PROBATION NUNC PRO TUNC to Mr. James L. Shumate, 
Attorney for Defendant, P.O. Box 623, Cedar City, Utah 84721-
0623, by first-class mail, postaqe fully prepaid, on this 
day of December, 1989. 
tkikm IHMM. 
S e c r e t a r y 
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